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Changing Homeland Security: 
In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful? 
Christopher Bellavita 
ABSTRACT : 
The failure of public safety disciplines to 
prevent the September 11, 2001 attack gave 
“homeland security” its chance to emerge 
as a competing paradigm for organizing 
the nation’s security. But the other 
disciplines that contribute to the homeland 
security enterprise have not simply waited 
for this new discipline to emerge. They 
responded to the twenty-first century’s 
national security threats by getting better 
at what they do. They may be eliminating 
the need for homeland security as a distinct 
public safety/national security paradigm. 
At the end of 2010, we were better 
prepared as a nation to prevent attacks 
and respond to disasters than we were a 
decade ago. But that progress may have 
more to do with the work of homeland 
security practitioners than with homeland 
security intellectuals. If homeland security 
is to become a useful academic and 
professional discipline, it has to 
demonstrate how looking at enduring 
problems through a homeland security 
framework adds significant value not 




What do the concept of homeland 
security and the intellectual program 
surrounding that concept actually 
contribute to the nation’s security?   
Since 2004 I have asked each new 
homeland security class at the Naval 
Postgraduate School what is working in 
homeland security and what needs to be 
improved. I ask the questions again 
eighteen months later when they are 
about to graduate.  
Over the years, the answers to both 
questions – and at both times – tend to 
constellate around the same issues: 
• Collaboration — among people, 
agencies, disciplines, jurisdictions 
and increasingly, nations; 
• Information sharing and 
intelligence;  
• Preventing terrorism – arising from 
international and domestic sources; 
• Preparedness – in its many guises, 
including most recently “resilience”; 
• Transportation security – aviation, 
rail, other public transportation; 
• Border control – northern, southern 
and coastal; 
• Illegal immigration; 
• Technology – its role in homeland 
security; what problems it solves and 
creates; 
• Risk management – to include risk 
assessment and risk informed 
decision-making; 
• Resources – where they come from, 
how they are allocated, how they are 
used to sustain progress; 
• Critical infrastructure protection – 
the interface between public and 
private sectors; 
• Leadership – at all levels in the 
homeland security enterprise. 
Our master’s degree participants – all 
of whom work in a homeland security-
related public safety discipline – believe 
the nation is continuously improving its 
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ability to prevent attacks, respond to 
disasters, and recover from a variety of 
incidents. They also believe we have 
much more work to do, work that will 
never be completed. 
As I reviewed what happened in the 
homeland security enterprise during 
2010, and compared that with previous 
“Year in Review” articles, I saw 
something similar to what our master’s 
participants observed. 1 Most of the 
issues that helped to define homeland 
security have remained fairly consistent 
over the past five years:   
• The meaning of homeland security,  
• The nature of the threat,  
• Surprise (anticipating and 
responding to), and  
• The strategic approaches to 
achieving the various homeland 
security missions.  
Those concerns – along with the 
other issues noted above – outline what 
I consider to be the enduring problems 
in homeland security. The dynamic 
contours of the homeland security 
enterprise are shaped largely by the 
shifting attention and neglect these 
issues receive.2 
 I have little doubt we are better 
prepared as a nation to prevent attacks 
and respond to disasters than we were 
on September 10, 2001. But it seems to 
me most of that progress has more to do 
with the work of homeland security 
artisans – practitioners skilled in both 
the practice and theory of what they do 
– than homeland security intellectuals.3 
Public and private sector 
professionals, exercising the knowledge 
and skills they earned through 
discipline-specific training, education, 
and experience make the nation safer 
and more secure than it was a decade 
ago.   
It is less apparent to me what value 
“homeland security” as a distinct – 
albeit still emerging – body of 
knowledge or discipline has contributed 
to that progress. 
If homeland security is to become a 
useful academic and professional 
discipline, I think it has to demonstrate 
how looking at enduring problems 
through a homeland security framework 
adds significant value not provided by 
other disciplines. If it is unable to 
demonstrate value, homeland security 
may devolve into a legacy concept, like 
the now largely forgotten idea of civil 
defense.4 
Homeland Security as a Discipline 
The idea of homeland security as a 
distinct discipline took root initially 
because of the federal government’s 
reaction to September 11, 2001. The 
homeland security concept was 
premised on the assumption that public 
safety disciplines operated too much in 
isolation from each other. That 
separation created vulnerabilities al 
Qaeda exploited.5  Homeland security 
was supposed to prevent something like 
that from ever happening again.6 
Shortly after the government acted, 
some educational institutions explored 
whether there was – or could be – 
enough substance in the homeland 
security idea to construct an academic 
discipline around its constituent 
concerns.7 By 2010, more than 200 
colleges and universities (as well as a 
few high schools) offered courses and 
programs in homeland security.8 
An academic discipline minimally 
requires: 
• A set of problems to work on; 
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• A body of knowledge to apply to 
those problems; 
• Scientifically legitimate research 
about the problems; 
• Textbooks that aggregate the core 
knowledge of the discipline; 
• Programs to educate students at the 
undergraduate and graduate levels, 
including developing PhD programs 
to advance knowledge in the field.9 
I believe people interested in 
homeland security as a potential 
academic discipline have made modest 
advances in each of those areas, with the 
possible exception of educating 
homeland security PhDs. 
But the other disciplines that 
contribute to the homeland security 
enterprise have not simply stood around 
waiting for a new discipline to emerge.10 
They responded to the twenty-first 
century’s national security threats by 
getting better at what they do. They may 
be eliminating the need for homeland 
security as a distinct public 
safety/national security paradigm. 
I still believe there is a place for 
homeland security as a professional and 
intellectual discipline. But it is a belief 
based increasingly more on faith than 
evidence.11 
Homeland Security and Paradigms  
As has been argued elsewhere, 
homeland security can be seen as a pre-
paradigm discipline.12 In the world of 
practice and in the academy, it must 
compete against the more mature 
perspectives offered by the other 
disciplines in the homeland security 
enterprise. 
Thomas Kuhn uses “paradigm” in two 
senses that I will adapt for this essay. 13 
A paradigm symbolizes: 1) the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, [and] 
techniques… shared by members of a 
given community [of practice]. 
A paradigm describes the: 2) concrete 
puzzle solutions which, employed as 
models or examples, can replace explicit 
rules as the basis for the solution of the 
remaining puzzles of normal science. 
Translated into a homeland security 
context, a paradigm is a fundamental 
way of thinking about a discipline’s 
theories and practices. Each traditional 
discipline in the homeland security 
enterprise (for example law 
enforcement, emergency management, 
fire service, public health, and so on) has 
particular knowledge, skills, and 
preferred ways to think about the issues 
its members attend to. Because “each 
group uses its own paradigm to argue in 
that paradigm’s defense,”14 paradigms 
provide raw material for constructing 
the disciplinary stovepipes one 
continues to find within the homeland 
security enterprise. 
The second part of Kuhn’s definition 
refers to a discipline’s “best practices.” 
For example, some people believe the 
incident command system and its 
National Incident Management System 
extension should be the foundational 
model for all incident response. The 
National Response Framework holds a 
similar position as disciplinary 
exemplar. Both models provide general 
solutions to a broad set of problems; 
they do not provide inviolate rules.15 
Each of what can be termed the 
participating homeland security 
disciplines brings with it an “articulated 
body of problems” and a commitment to 
use particular values, knowledge, skills 
and practices to (i.e., paradigms) to 
address those problems.16 
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For the routine problems 
practitioners encounter, they can use 
their discipline’s “normal science,”17 
tested and proven behaviors that reflect 
successful solutions to similar problems. 
This approach works as long as 
practitioners face “tame problems,” 
situations characterized by relatively 
well-defined problems, obvious stopping 
points, and solutions that can be 
objectively judged as right or wrong.18 
The strategies are less effective for 
“wicked problems”: ambiguously 
defined situations generated by nested 
social and political complexity, 
disagreements about what a solution 
looks like, and so on.19    
The most intractable issues in the 
homeland security enterprise are related 
more closely to wicked problems than to 
tame ones, constraining the ability of 
traditional disciplines to apply normal 
problem solving methods to enduring 
problems.20 
But looked at from the perspective of 
someone who is not an advocate for 
homeland security as a discipline, one 
could argue there are very few public 
safety activities undertaken after 
September 11, 2001 that were not done 
in some form prior to the attack. 
Information was being shared – maybe 
not as effectively as it could have been, 
but it was being shared. Agencies were 
collaborating. Grants were being 
awarded and spent. Plans were being 
written and exercised. Lessons were 
being learned and incorporated into new 
procedures.  Each discipline was 
practicing its version of normal science. 
The central difference between then 
and a decade later is all those practices 
have improved across the board. Yes 
there is room for additional 
improvement. But critical security 
practices in this nation are better than 
they used to be. That progress may be 
enough to obviate the need for a distinct 
homeland security discipline. 
Is There a Need  
for a New Paradigm? 
What would justify bringing a new 
paradigm into an enterprise that may no 
longer need it? What, asks Kuhn, causes 
a community to abandon one paradigm 
for another? What must people do “to 
convert the entire profession… to their 
way of seeing science and the world?”21 
Existing paradigms (represented in 
this discussion by traditional public 
safety disciplines) continue 
unchallenged as long as they 
satisfactorily address the problems they 
face. “Paradigm testing occurs only after 
persistent failure to solve a noteworthy 
puzzle has given rise to a crisis.”22 
 September 11, 2001 was the initial 
crisis that opened the door to homeland 
security as a potential new discipline. 
Hurricane Katrina created a second 
crisis. Pandemic flu (H1N1) created 
another opportunity for homeland 
security to step forward and 
demonstrate how the framework it 
provides is in any way superior to 
traditional security approaches. That 
(arguably unrealized) opportunity may 
be vanishing. 
Paradigm change begins with 
anomalies: when gaps arise between 
expectations about what should happen 
and the reality of what actually does 
happen. Anomalies typically have to be 
“sufficiently fundamental” to invoke the 
unease and dissatisfaction that leads to 
the next step in paradigm change: a 
crisis.23 
“Sometimes,” notes Kuhn, “an 
anomaly will clearly call into question 
explicit and fundamental generalizations 
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of [a dominant paradigm].24 But an 
anomaly does not always have to 
challenge fundamentals before it sparks 
a change. If the normal science practiced 
by a discipline inhibits important work, 
the anomaly is worthy of “concerted 
scrutiny.” 
“When… an anomaly comes to seem 
more than just another puzzle of normal 
science [that can be solved using 
existing frameworks], the transition to 
crisis… has begun.”25 
Said less elegantly, when business as 
usual gets in the way of doing what 
needs to be accomplished, it may be 
time to challenge basic assumptions. 
This is precisely what homeland security 
as an intellectual framework was 
supposed to do. 
Is the Nation Over  
its Security Crisis? 
Efforts to address what I called the 
enduring problems of homeland security 
can be seen from a “glass half-full” and a 
“glass half-empty” perspective. 
Is the nation (as a whole) generally 
content with the incremental progress 
made in addressing many of the 
enduring problems outlined at the start 
of this essay and visible in the hundreds 
of homeland security-related incidents 
and activities that occurred in 2010?26 
Or is there a significant demand for 
more substantial and more rapid 
improvement in most, if not all those 
areas? 
Anomalies morph into crises (“the 
common awareness that something 
important has gone wrong”)27 when the 
normal way of dealing with problems is 
unsatisfactory. The “failure of existing 
rules [to solve problems] is a prelude to 
a search for new ones.”28  
With the exception of continuing – 
and important – problems at the 
southern border and with aviation 
security, I am not aware of significant 
national dissatisfaction during 2010 
with existing rules for addressing the 
enduring problems. The traditional 
disciplines in the homeland security 
enterprise, relying on their normal (and 
improved) paradigms, may have passed 
through last decade’s doubts about the 
appropriateness of their conceptual 
dominance.  
An outcome like that is compatible 
with Kuhn’s claim about how paradigm 
crises end.29 
Sometimes existing paradigms 
eventually solve or ameliorate the 
problems that provoked a crisis.  
As one example, in 2010 – and after 
some controversy – fusion centers 
improved their ability to balance 
information sharing and privacy 
protection.30 This kind of gradual 
improvement based largely on trial, 
error, and correction happens routinely 
throughout homeland security. 
Sometimes problems resist almost all 
attempts at solution and the “problem is 
… set aside for a future generation with 
more developed tools.”31   
One could argue many important 
homeland security-related issues have 
so far been impervious to solutions: for 
instance, trying to measure 
preparedness in a way that will satisfy 
congress and accountants; figuring out 
how to formally incorporate social 
media into prevention and response 
activities; reducing illegal immigration; 
controlling the southern, northern, and 
coastal borders; and reducing the 
number of congressional committees 
that have a stake in homeland security. 
Perhaps these problems are best left to 
future generations of (homeland 
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security?) scholars and practitioners to 
address. 
A crisis might also end, writes Kuhn, 
“with the emergence of a new candidate 
for paradigm and with the ensuing 
battle over its acceptance.”32   
Here is how that part of the change 
process works:33  
A new interpretation of some part of 
the world “emerges first in the mind of 
one or a few individuals.”  These are 
men and women who typically are new 
to an enterprise, and who are attracted 
by a “crisis provoking” problem.34 
Applied to homeland security, this 
might refer to undergraduate and 
graduate students who study homeland 
security, and to scholars and 
practitioners who may be at the 
sociological margins of one of the 
traditional disciplines: people who for a 
variety of reasons are not satisfied with 
the established way of addressing 
national security concerns. Because they 
are either comparatively new to the field 
or are dissatisfied with existing 
approaches, they are less committed to a 
traditional discipline’s ways of thinking 
about and working on issues. 
The failure of existing disciplines – 
and the paradigms they embody – to 
prevent the September 11, 2001 attack 
gave “homeland security” its chance to 
emerge as a competing paradigm for 
organizing the nation’s security. 
Homeland security acted as a symbolic 
catalyst to trigger reflection and change 
in traditional disciplines. Maybe the 
homeland security concept has served 
its social purpose. Maybe it has 
contributed all it reasonable can to the 
question of how to establish a more 
secure nation. 
Are We Finished  
with Homeland Security? 
Thomas Kuhn wrote, “The single most 
prevalent claim advanced by the 
proponents of a new paradigm is that 
they can solve problems that have led 
the old [paradigms] to a crisis.” 35 
That assertion creates a fair test for 
advocates of a homeland security 
paradigm:  How does a homeland 
security perspective (whatever that may 
mean in practice) help solve any of the 
enduring problems outlined at the start 
of this essay? How are ideas derived 
from that perspective superior to the 
approaches championed by other 
disciplines in the homeland security 
enterprise?   
Kuhn also wrote, “In the development 
of a scientific field…a number of schools 
[of thought] compete for domination…. 
[In] the wake of some notable scientific 
achievement, the number of schools is 
greatly reduced…and a more efficient 
mode of…practice begins.”36   
This provides another test for 
homeland security’s claim to be a 
discipline: What have been its notable 
scientific achievements? 
To the best of my knowledge, there 
have been no notable scientific 
achievements – either theoretical or 
practical – as a result of looking at 
security-related issues from a homeland 
security academic or intellectual 
framework. 
But one can ask the same question of 
law enforcement, fire services, 
emergency management, public health 
and the other allied disciplines – and get 
the same answer.  There have been no 
notable scientific achievements over the 
past decade (that I am aware of) 
generated by their traditional paradigms 
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that suggest any of homeland security’s 
enduring problems will soon disappear. 
I believe the opportunity remains for 
a “homeland security perspective” to 
make distinct and valuable intellectual 
contributions to national security.  But I 
do not think it has much time to 
convincingly demonstrate its utility. 
Where to From Here? 
I get my persisting belief in the potential 
of homeland security – and in the 
difficulty it faces realizing that potential 
– from Thomas Kuhn’s historical 
analysis. 
Philosophers of science have repeatedly 
demonstrated that more than one 
theoretical construction can always be 
placed upon a given collection of data. 
History of science indicates that, 
particularly in the early developmental 
stages of a new paradigm, it is not even 
very difficult to invent such alternates. 
But that invention of alternates is just 
what scientists seldom undertake 
except during the pre-paradigm stage of 
their science’s development and at very 
special [crises] occasions during its 
subsequent evolution. So long as the 
tools a paradigm supplies continue to 
prove capable of solving problems it 
defines, science moves fastest and 
penetrates most deeply through 
confident employment of those tools. 
The reason is clear. As in manufacture 
so in science – retooling is an 
extravagance to be reserved for the 
occasion that demands it. The 
significance of crises is the indication 
they provide that an occasion for 
retooling has arrived.”37  
I believe a homeland security 
perspective can be the means to retool 
significant parts of public safety for the 
twenty-first century.   
Here is a path I think those who are 
committed to homeland security as a 
distinct discipline might productively 
travel. Some of these activities already 
are underway.  
1. Clarify the set of problems the 
discipline does and should work on: 
what we know about causes, 
consequences, and approaches to 
addressing those issues. 
2. Clarify the foundational knowledge 
to be applied to those problems. This 
work should also incorporate 
categories Kuhn outlines in his 
“disciplinary matrix:”38 
• Shared values and ethical 
principles; 
• Symbolic generalizations that 
(potentially) unite the discipline 
[e.g., Risk = ƒ (Threat, 
Vulnerability, Consequence)]; 
• Shared commitments to certain 
beliefs, analogies, and metaphors; 
• Shared examples and cases that 
students encounter from the start 
of their homeland security 
education demonstrating how 
homeland security work is done, 
and highlighting the link between 
problem and solution; 
3. Systematically gather and feature 
exemplars of quality homeland 
security research; 
4. Write textbooks that feature the 
discipline’s core knowledge; 
5. Educate homeland security PhDs. 
On December 30, 2010, “Wired 
Science” featured the top scientific 
breakthroughs of 2010. The article 
reminded readers that in 2010 scientists 
made a reasonable interpretation of the 
color of a dinosaur, created a synthetic 
self-replicating form of life, decoded 
another drug resistant superbug, 
produced a human embryo with genetic 
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material from three parents, created an 
HIV drug that seems to have remarkable 
success, and found millions of tons of 
water on the moon.39 
In future years, perhaps beginning in 
2011, I hope we can report 
breakthroughs in homeland security 
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